American Revolution’s Attempts to Incorporate the 14th British Colony, Canada.
Continental Congress Appeals to Canadians (1774–1775).
Even before open warfare, Patriot leaders looked northward to Canada (then the British province of Quebec) as a potential “fourteenth colony.” The First Continental Congress in 1774 addressed the French Canadian populace, urging them to join in opposition to British “tyranny.” When the Revolution began, the Second Continental Congress continued these appeals. In May 1775, Congress appointed John Jay, Samuel Adams, and Silas Deane to draft a letter “to the oppressed inhabitants of Canada,” inviting Canadians to “join with us in resolving to be free” and cast off “the fetters of slavery”imposed by Britain. This “Second Letter to the Inhabitants of Canada” (as it is now known) painted British rule and the recent Quebec Act as despotic, claiming “by the introduction of your present form of government…you and your wives and children are made slaves”. Congress’ outreach acknowledged Canadians as “fellow-sufferers” under British oppression and implored them to unite with the rebelling colonies. Despite these earnest letters (one in 1774 and two in 1775–76), the effort “ultimately failed, and Quebec…remained loyal to Britain,” yielding only a few hundred Canadian recruits to the Patriot cause
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The 1775 Invasion of Quebec
After these written appeals made little headway, the Americans launched a military invasion of Canada in 1775. The campaign had dual aims: to preempt British attacks from the north and to “secure [the] northern border and persuade the Canadians to reject British administration”
. In autumn 1775, General Richard Montgomery led forces from Lake Champlain, capturing Montreal, while Colonel Benedict Arnold led a grueling march through Maine toward Quebec City. The Americans hoped that victory would inspire Canada’s inhabitants to join the revolt. General George Washington, in a message to Canadians, argued that expelling the British from Canada would “crown our virtuous struggles” and “render the freedom of our country secure”
. However, the assault on Quebec City (December 31, 1775) was repulsed – Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The ragged Continental forces then besieged Quebec through a harsh winter, suffering from dwindling supplies and a rampant smallpox outbreak. By spring 1776 the once-promising offensive was clearly turning into a disaster
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Franklin’s Mission to Montreal (1776)
In April 1776, Congress made a last diplomatic attempt to win Canadian support by sending a high-level delegation to Montreal. This commission included Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll of Carrollton(accompanied by Carroll’s cousin Father John Carroll, to help reassure the Catholic French Canadians). Franklin – then 70 and ill – traveled north to urge Canadians to unite with the rebellious colonies. The commissioners quickly found the situation dire. Upon arriving in Montreal, Franklin and his colleagues reported “the lowness of the Continental credit”in Canada and widespread disillusionment with the American cause.
Because Congress had sent no hard currency, Continental paper money was nearly worthless in Canada, and even friendly locals refused to sell provisions without instant payment in silver or gold. The commissioners warned Congress in May 1776 that Canadians now “consider the Congress as bankrupt and their cause as desperate.” In such circumstances, they wrote, “the few friends we have here, will scarce venture to exert themselves in promoting [union], till they see our credit recover’d and a sufficient army arrived to secure the possession of the country”.
In other words, any hope of persuading Canada to “accede to a union with these colonies” would require far more money and troops to prove the American commitment.
The letters from Franklin’s commission grew increasingly bleak. By May 8, with British reinforcements expected imminently, the commissioners candidly advised Congress that without immediate support it was better to abandon Canada. They described being “pestered hourly with demands…that they cannot answer” in a colony where “our cause has a majority of enemies”.
.Canadian inhabitants who initially “suffered us to enter their country as friends” had been alienated by unpaid requisitions and indiscipline, and many now “wish our departure.” Rumors swirled that locals were plotting to expel the Continentals as soon as British troops arrived.
Franklin and his co-commissioners concluded that “if money cannot be had to support [our] army here with honor…it is better immediately to withdraw it.” They noted pointedly that even the mighty British Empire could not hold a hostile province by force alone, “the fact before your eyes” being that “the powerful British nation cannot keep an army in a country where the inhabitants are become enemies.” Unless Americans could “make this people our friends” by paying debts and respecting the populace, they warned, the effort was doomed.
Shortly thereafter, in June 1776, the starving, sickly American army retreated from Canada, ending the campaign. British Governor Guy Carleton, reinforced by regulars (including German mercenaries), pursued the demoralized Continental troops out of Quebec. The attempt to bring Canada into the revolution had decisively collapsed.
American Reflections on the Failed Canadian Expedition
The failure in Canada prompted frank introspection among American leaders. In July 1776, John Jay wrote that “our affairs in Canada have lately become the subject of animadversion; and the miscarriages in that country are…imputed to the inattention of Congress.” He found it “amazing that a strict inquiry has not been made into the behaviour of those under whose direction we have met with nothing but repeated losses in that country.”
Jay echoed a common sentiment that Congress’s poor planning and support had doomed the campaign. John Adams had reached a similar conclusion even earlier. In April 1776, Adams admitted to General Horatio Gates, “That we have been a little tardy in providing for Canada is true—owing to innumerable difficulties. However, we have been roused at last, and I hope have done pretty well.”
By June, as the retreat unfolded, Adams was more somber, writing that “Our affairs in Canada are in a confused and disastrous situation. But I hope they will not be worse.”
Congress did belatedly scramble to send money, reinforcements, and even a special committee (which included Adams himself) to bolster the northern army. But these measures came too late. In July 1776, Congress received a report identifying the “great causes of the miscarriages in Canada”: short enlistments (most troops’ terms expired in winter), lack of hard money, smallpox(which ravaged the ranks), and other logistical failures
. Indeed, soldiers’ enlistments had lapsed just when Montgomery and later General Wooster most needed them, forcing rushed decisions and leaving the army constantly understrength
. The chronic money shortage was equally damaging – Congress itself acknowledged that want of gold or silver made supply “difficult and precarious” and left troops unpaid
. As the congressional commission in Montreal had warned, “not the most trifling service can be procured” when paper dollars are valueless.
.Desperate American commanders resorted to seizing goods, which “contributed much to…changing [Canadians’] good dispositions towards us into enmity,” one commission letter reported.
.In short, by mid-1776 many Patriots conceded that their own shortcomings – inconsistent support, inadequate supplies, and mismanagement – largely accounted for the debacle. “Congress are not a fit body to act as a council of war,”lamented commissioner Samuel Chase.
.John Adams observed that indecision and internal divisions in Congress had led some leaders to be “slow and languid”in prosecuting the Canada expedition (clinging to hopes of reconciliation with Britain in 1775), undermining the unity of purpose needed for success.
British and Canadian Perspectives
From the Canadian point of view, the American invasion offered little appeal and much risk. British authorities had worked since 1763 to secure the loyalty of their new French Canadian subjects. In 1774 the Quebec Act granted protections for Catholic Church rights and French civil law in Quebec, a pragmatic concession that paid dividends during the Revolution. Governor Guy Carleton astutely cultivated the colony’s elites – both the “Canadian noblesse”(seigneurs) and the Catholic clergy – to ensure their support for the Crown
. As a result, when the Americans arrived proclaiming liberty, “Catholic leaders actively advocated for the king’s rule and punished political dissent” while “the landed ‘nobles’…resisted the American occupation” and even led militia units to defend the province.
The Bishop of Quebec, Jean-Olivier Briand, was an especially powerful ally to Britain. Bishop Briand, grateful for the Quebec Act’s protections, strongly opposed the American rebellion – and he reminded his flock that the same Congress now courting them had only recently denounced Catholicism in virulent terms. (Indeed, the First Continental Congress’s 1774 address to Britain had called the Catholic faith “impious, bigoted, and murderous,” which French Canadians like Briand did not forget.) Viewing the Patriot overtures with deep suspicion, Briand ordered his priests to discourage cooperation with the “heretical” invaders. The clergy, almost to a man, heeded him and “remained loyal” to Britain. Many habitants (ordinary French Canadian farmers) simply wished to avoid being caught in a war between two outside powers; they had no desire to trade British rule for American rule. When American forces began faltering – and especially after some troops looted supplies – neutral Canadians tilted against the rebellion. British commanders shrewdly exploited this. Even before British reinforcements arrived in 1776, loyal local militias and informants helped Carleton contain the American foothold and maintain a toehold in besieged Quebec City through the winter.
Once spring came, the British army’s superior naval mobility on the St. Lawrence allowed rapid relief of Quebec. In early May 1776, British ships sailed up the St. Lawrence with troops and supplies, decisively turning the tide. King George III and his ministers had never been inclined to relinquish Canada, viewing it as vital to the empire. In fact, in early 1776 George III emphatically declared his determination to restore British control in Quebec, and Parliament mustered the “means and know-how” to do so.
Britain’s resolve proved crucial: as one historian notes, the Americans could not have held Canada “unless there was a decisive political turn in London” to let it go.
In sum, the British political and military response – from the Quebec Act’s conciliatory policies to Carleton’s able leadership and the overwhelming force eventually brought to bear – ensured that the Canadian provinces “grappled with and rebuffed” the American overtures
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Canada in the American British Peace Treaty of Paris Negotiations
Although the United States failed to “incorporate” Canada during the war, the issue did not entirely vanish. In 1778, Congress symbolically opened the door for Canada’s future admission to the union: the Articles of Confederation adopted that year included a special provision that “Canada acceding to this confederation…shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this union” without needing approval by the other states. [archives.gov ](Any other colony would require consent of nine states.) This Article XI reflected the continued hope – however faint – that Quebec might yet choose to join the American republic. In reality, by 1782–83 the Canadians had shown no inclination to do so. During the Treaty of Paris negotiations with Britain, American diplomats prioritized fishing rights, western territorial boundaries, and independence itself over any renewed claim to Canada. John Adams, John Jay, and Benjamin Franklin, as peace commissioners, all understood that Britain was unwilling to surrender its remaining North American colonies after losing the thirteen. Still, Franklin characteristically floated a creative idea: in April 1782, he privately suggested to British envoy Richard Oswald that Britain cede Canada to the U.S. as the price of a durable peace. In a memorandum of conversation, Franklin argued that British retention of Canada would “lead to future quarrels” and that giving it up voluntarily “would have an excellent effect” on reconciliation.
[Franklins Words]He proposed that Britain “offer to give up that province [Canada/Quebec]” and in return receive guarantees of free trade there, with proceeds from Canadian land sales used to compensate American Loyalists for their confiscated property.
This bold proposal – effectively asking Britain to hand over Canada as reparations for wartime damage – was more a bargaining gambit than a likely outcome. The British negotiators politely listened but never seriously entertained the notion. In the final 1783 Treaty of Paris, Britain firmly retained Canada (and East/West Florida, which it soon ceded to Spain), while recognizing American independence and granting the new United States territory south of the Great Lakes. Franklin’s Canadian cession idea evaporated, and the treaty’s articles drew a boundary between the United States and British Canada that endures (with slight modifications) to this day.
Thus, all British attempts to reclaim the 13 colonies failed – and all American attempts to absorb the northern colonies failed – resulting in a postwar continent divided between the United States and British North America.
Why the Canadian Venture Failed – and Its Legacy
Historians have exhaustively analyzed why the Americans’ “War of Liberation” in Canada fell short. In hindsight, the venture faced overwhelming obstacles. A recent study titled The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony bluntly concludes that given Britain’s naval dominance and the tenuous American logistics, “it is hard to believe the American colonies ever decided to launch their invasion of Canada”
. The Patriots’ optimism in 1775 – fueled by the “rage militaire” after early victories and a faith that Providence favored their cause
– led them to underestimate the challenges of taking Quebec. Those challenges proved to be many: military and financial overstretch, disease, harsh geography, and, most critically, lack of local support. The invasion was launched “on the strategic planning equivalent of a hope and a prayer,” with virtually no professional war-planning behind it. [allthingsliberty.com
allthingsliberty.com]American forces were chronically undermanned (thanks to short-term enlistments and slow recruitment) and undersupplied over an impossibly long supply line.
allthingsliberty.com General Schuyler, who organized the campaign’s supply from New York, struggled to send even a fraction of the men and provisions needed, and he repeatedly warned Congress of the shortfalls.
Washington’s decision to dispatch Arnold through the Maine wilderness without adequate supply lines further stretched the American capacity to support operations in Canada.
allthingsliberty.com In the end, as one delegate quipped, Congress had asked its generals to “make bricks without straw”, expecting miracles from an under-resourced army.
Equally important were the political and cultural factors. The Americans misjudged the depth of French Canadian unwillingness to join what many saw as a foreign rebellion. The habitants had enjoyed a dozen years of peace under British rule; the Patriots’ anti-Catholic past and the economic disruption that rebellion entailed (e.g. the Continental Congress’s trade boycotts threatened Canada’s fur trade)allthingsliberty.com gave Canadians little incentive to risk life and property for an American cause. One Patriot spy in Montreal had reported back in early 1775 that even ardent local sympathizers were not prepared to “accept economic ruin” to join the Congress’s boycott and revolution.
allthingsliberty.com When Congress’s promises of liberty came paired with an army that requisitioned supplies without payment, it only confirmed Canadian skepticism. As a result, Britain won the battle for Canadian allegiance, aided by the Quebec Act’s concessions and Americans’ own “political missteps”.
The “support of the French Canadians” indeed proved decisive in the possession of Canada.
Lacking that support, the Americans could seize key forts and cities temporarily but could not hold them when Britain counterattacked. In mid-1776, Carleton’s counteroffensive swiftly drove the disintegrating Continental forces out of Quebec. From that point on, Canada became a crucial British bastion: in 1777 General John Burgoyne launched his invasion south from Canada, aiming to slice the rebellious states (an effort that ended in defeat at Saratoga, ironically securing French alliance for the Americans). For the remainder of the war, British-controlled Canada served as a secure base for troops and a haven for Loyalist refugees. Indeed, as many as 40,000 Loyalists fled to Canada during and after the war, strengthening Britain’s Canadian colonies and further ensuring they would not merge with the United States.
The failure to bring Canada into the Revolution thus shaped the geopolitical landscape of North America. The United States emerged from the war confined to essentially the territory of the original thirteen colonies (plus the trans-Appalachian west up to the Mississippi), while Britain retained a sizable foothold in the north. The U.S.–Canada border became a permanent feature – one that both sides would fortify in the years to come. Tensions along this border persisted (fueled by British support for Native American resistance to U.S. expansion from bases in Canada), eventually contributing to the War of 1812. In the immediate aftermath of independence, however, American statesmen mostly made peace with Canada’s separate trajectory. By 1783, John Jay and others accepted that Quebec and Nova Scotia were to remain British territories; U.S. diplomats focused on securing trade with, rather than dominion over, Canada. Still, the idea of a “Fourteenth Colony” lived on in American imagination. Decades later, during the War of 1812 and beyond, some expansionists would again contemplate Canadian annexation, reflecting a long-running sentiment that the destiny of Canada and the United States were linked.
In sum, the American Revolution’s Canadian expedition stands as a fascinating “what-if” of the war. Through contemporary letters and modern scholarship alike, the consensus is that the mission failed due to a mix of American over-optimism and under-preparation, Canadian ambivalence, and British resolve. As one historian observed, the Continental Army’s retreat from Canada meant that “Canada would not be joining the Continental Congress as a fourteenth colony” and the northern frontier would instead remain a boundary between two nations.
This outcome greatly influenced the balance of power in North America. While the new United States had to proceed without Canada, its success in the Revolution still owed something to that failed mission – for British Canada became the springboard for Burgoyne’s ill-fated campaign, whose defeat helped secure American independence. The legacy of 1775–76, therefore, is a complex one. The dream of a united continent under the American flag was deferred, and a distinct Canadian polity endured. Historians such as Mark R. Anderson and Justin H. Smith (author of Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony in 1907) note that this divergence set the stage for “two founding peoples” in the north: one American, one Canadian. allthingsliberty.com The American Revolution may have stopped at the Canadian border, but its reverberations – and the lessons from that ambitious but ill-fated Canadian venture – continued to shape the destiny of both the United States and Canada in the centuries that followed.
What If Canada Had Joined the American Revolution?
First our flag would have 14 stripes and not 13.
If Canada had joined the American Revolution, the symbolic representation of the United States would have been quite different. The Betsy Ross flag might have featured 14 stars instead of 13, and every iteration of the U.S. flag afterward would have reflected this additional colony-turned-state.
Imagine a modern U.S. flag with 60 stars and 14 stripes—a striking visual of an alternate history where the northern border was never drawn. The U.S. might have evolved with a stronger French cultural influence, and without a British-ruled Canada providing a haven for Loyalists, sectional tensions that led to the Civil War could have played out differently—or even been avoided altogether.
It’s a compelling historical “what-if” that reimagines the United States as a vastly different nation—one that might never have experienced the same divisions that ultimately led to war.
Imagine a modern U.S. flag with 60 stars and 14 stripes—a striking visual of an alternate history where the northern border was never drawn. The U.S. might have evolved with a stronger French cultural influence, and without a British-ruled Canada providing a haven for Loyalists, sectional tensions that led to the Civil War could have played out differently—or even been avoided altogether.
Had Canada joined the American Revolution, the geopolitical landscape of North America could have been dramatically altered. A united front against Britain might have weakened the Crown’s military presence, potentially accelerating American victory and even forcing Britain to cede more territory in the Treaty of Paris. The U.S. would have gained control over Quebec and Ontario, expanding its influence over vital trade routes and natural resources. The integration of French Canadians into the new republic could have fostered a bilingual, bicultural United States or, conversely, intensified internal divisions. British Loyalists, who fled to Canada after the war, may have had fewer safe havens, reshaping the post-war settlement of the continent. With no British stronghold in the north, conflicts like the War of 1812 might have been averted, and the U.S.-Canada border as we know it today might never have existed. Instead, history took a different path, cementing Canada’s status as a separate entity and ensuring that British influence remained in North America for generations.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Why did the American Revolution fail to bring Canada into the fight?
The American Revolution failed to bring Canada into the fight due to a combination of factors, including the loyalty of French Canadians to the British Crown (thanks to the Quebec Act of 1774), military defeats such as the failed invasion of Quebec in 1775, and the reluctance of Canadians to support the rebellion.
What was Benjamin Franklin’s role in trying to make Canada the 14th colony?
Benjamin Franklin led a diplomatic mission to Canada in 1776 to persuade French Canadians to join the revolution. However, his efforts failed due to local distrust, economic hardships, and the presence of British forces.
What was the significance of the Quebec Act in 1774?
The Quebec Act of 1774 was a British law that expanded Quebec’s borders and granted religious freedoms to French Catholics. This act helped secure the loyalty of French Canadians, making them less likely to support the American Revolution.
Did Canada ever consider joining the United States?
During the American Revolution, the Continental Congress offered Canada the opportunity to join as the 14th colony. However, there was little interest from the Canadian population, and Britain successfully maintained control.
Was Canada included in the Treaty of Paris (1783)?
No, Canada remained under British control following the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Benjamin Franklin attempted to negotiate for Canada’s cession, but Britain refused to give it up.
How did the failed invasion of Canada impact the American Revolution?
The failed invasion of Canada in 1775-1776 weakened the American war effort by diverting resources and exposing logistical weaknesses. It also allowed Britain to maintain a northern stronghold, which later served as a base for Loyalist refugees and military campaigns.
